Duck Dodgers: M. This is an oblique reference to The Shining. It's most haunted room is room , where Danny is attacked by the woman in the bath. Room was used in the film of The Shining the novel had the room as to avoid hotel guests being scared of room Destroy All Humans! Ban the Sadist Videos! The Batman vs. This references Jack Torrence's similar, "Here's Johnny! Room is a reference to The Shining which takes place in a hotel. Kind of like my man Jack in The Shining. Life on Mars: Episode 1. Their overall look is very reminiscent of the twins in the film.
Both Doc and Halloran have the ability to "shine". Also, photograph is shown. This is the same number as the scary room from The Shining. It's always an axe, isn't it? Remember - The Shining". In the Shining room is the room Dick Hallorann warns the Torrances to avoid. Also, the bar is set up like Lloyd's bar - the dignified bartender, the glowing bar, the bottles set up in the back wall, etc. This particular scene is also made very similar to the famous one in The Shining. Angel checks into the hotel, he asks to check in.
Joyce's response is a reference to The Shining: "Check in? But you've always been here. Ben also imitates Danny's hands motion and voice. The Kevin Bishop Show: Episode 1. Supernatural: Are You There, God? Elvis: Here's the actor playing Johnny.
The Fairly OddParents: Wishology! They resemble the two girls on the hotel in The Shining. Also, during the Club Management side-missions, Joni says this to Luis when she seduces him. The Jay Leno Show: Episode 1. Torrence is mentioned at the asylum. The Venture Bros. Venture tells Hank that just because the delivery man is black, it doesn't mean he has the shining. RiffTrax Live: Christmas Shorts-stravaganza! Livet i Fagervik: Episode 2. Muchachada nui: Episode 4.
Escape through a grass maze like the end of the film. In The Shining, Room is the room of horrors where Danny is attacked and Jack sees the horrific woman in the bathtub. Ugly Americans: Kill The intertitles e. Eventually, Gloria breaks through a wall with Bob and yells "Heeeere's Bobby! And another. She flips faster and faster -- in the exact same manner as Wendy in "The Shining,".
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Redrum, bitches! A line from The Shining, said by Jack Torrance. It's a similiar looking bike, plus the director used the same exaggerated rug-tile-rug sounds. The Real St. General Hospital: Episode 1. Tales from the Warner Bros. Chelsea Lately: Episode 7. Rewind This! Adventure Time: Shh!
Nostalgia Critic: A. Futurama: Calculon 2. The same recording is heard in The Shining after the actual death of the murderous Jack Torrance. Also, DVD is shown. Doofenshmirtz's castle. Up Late with Alec Baldwin: Episode 1. The poster is of model Azizi Johari from the 70's and is entitled "Supernatural Dream". Christmas Cruelty! These twins very much resemble the Grady sisters in both looks and mannerisms. And Thelma says "they make the girls in The Shining look like the Olsens". Walters says: "I am such a bitch when aunt flo shows up.
It bleeds so much, it's crazy. It's like the elevator doors opening in 'The Shining'. Jekyll and Mr. Bound: Here's Johnny! Why Horror? Everything Wrong with Love Me! Who's Johnny now, asshole? De slimste mens ter wereld: Episode 6. Countdown: Episode Opposed to the paradoxical is the every-day man, who has common opinion on his side. But he affords no more security, since with him everything drops asleep; whereas the paradoxical man awakens the mind to attend and investigate, thereby often leading to discoveries.
He deprives himself of the chance of progress when he isolates himself with his own judgment, claps applause to his own works, and seeks the touchstone of the beautiful in art only in himself. A, finally, moral egotist is one who limits all purposes to himself, sees no use in anything that does not bring him advantage, or perhaps, if a eudaBmonist, makes only his own advantage and happiness, but not the conception of duty, the primary determining ground of his will. For since every man forms a different conception of what he considers happiness, it is precisely egotism which reaches a point where no true touchstone of the genuine conception of duty is to be had, since such a conception must be a universally valid principle.
Hence all eudffimonists are practical egotists. To egotism we may oppose pluralism, that is, the habit of considering one s self as not embracing the whole world in. This much belongs to anthropology. For, so far as this distinction is concerned with regard to metaphysical conceptions, it lies utterly beyond the sphere of the science here to be treated.
If, for instance, the question were merely, whether I, as a thinking being, have cause to assume, outside of my own existence, the existence of a totality of other beings in communication with me—a totality called world—the question is not anthropological but merely metaphysical. Remark concerning the Formalities of Egotistical Language.
The question is, whether the meaning is not rather egotistic, that is, indicative of the monarch s own absolute power, which the King of Spain expresses by his Yo el Rey—I, the king. It seems however, after all, as if that formality of the highest authority was originally intended to signify a lowering We—the king and his council, or the legislature;.
But how did it happen that the conversational address, which was expressed in the old classic languages by Thou, hence unitarian, is expressed by various chiefly Germanic nations, pluralistic, You? All of which has probably been the result of the feudal system, according to which great care was taken that from the Royal dignity downward through all grades, until where the very dignity of man stopped and only the man remained—that is, to the class of serfs, who alone were addressed "thou" by their superiors, or to the children, who are as yet wit hunt a will —the proper grade of esteem due to the superior should never be lacking.
Concerning the Voluntary Consciousness of our Representations. The endeavor to become conscious of our representations is either an act of attention or of abstraction; and the latter is not merely an abstaining from attending or neglecting to attend for that would be distraction , but a real act of our cognizing faculty, a representation of which I am conscious that I keep it removed and apart from other representations in my consciousness. Hence we do not say " to abstract something" to keep something apart , but "to abstract from something," that is, from some determination of an object of my representation, whereby it receives the general character of a conception, and can thus be taken hold of by the understanding.
The power of abstraction is therefore, in this regard, much more difficult, but also more important, than the power of attention where sensuous representations are concerned. Many men are unhappy because they cannot abstract. The wooer might contract a good marriage if he could only overlook a wart in the face of his sweetheart, or a missing tooth in her mouth.
But it is a particularly naughty feature of our power of attention to fasten itself, even involuntarily, upon the very defects of others, to direct one s eye upon a missing button on the coat right opposite to one s eye, or upon that missing tooth, or upon an habitual defect of speech, and thus to confuse the other person, while at the same time, to be sure, spoiling one s own conversational amusement. If the main points are good, it is not only fair, but also prudent, to overlook the bad points of other people, and even those of our own circumstances; but this faculty of abstraction is a power of the mind which can be acquired only by practice.
Concerning Self-observation. To remark animadvertere is not quite to observe observare one s self. The latter is a methodical gathering together. Self-attention, in our intercourse with others, is unquestionably necessary ; but it must not be observable, for in that case it either embarasses or makes affected. The opposite of both is unconstrainedness an air degage , a self-contidence that others will not judge badly of one s behavior. A man who acts as if he were standing before a looking glass and noticing whether his manners became him or not, or who speaks as if he only, and not others, were listening to himself, is a sort of actor.
He wants to represent, and hence artificially produces a semblance of his person, and thereby, if his intention is perceived, loses in the opinion of others, because he is suspected of attempting to deceive. Frankness of manner in outward appearance, which does not occasion any such suspicion, is called natural behavior though it does not, on that account, exclude all fine art and taste , and pleases by the mere truthfulness of its expression. But when openheartedness is evidently the result of simplicity, that is, of the absence of all habitual dissimulation, it is called naiveness.
This frank manner of expression in a girl already approaching puberty, or in a country man ignorant of city manners, produces by its innocence and simplicity that is, by ignorance of the art of dissembling a cheerful laughter on the part of those who are already versed and practised in that art. It is not a laughter of contempt —for in our heart we honor purity and sincerity —but a good-natured, kind laughter at the inexperience in the evil although founded in our corrupt human nature art of dissembling, which, however, we ought rather to sigh over than laugh at, when we compare it with the idea of a still uncorrupted nature.
For, without perceiving it, we thus make supposed discoveries of ideas which we have ourselves put into our head, just as happened to a Bourignon with flattering, and to Pascal with terrifying, ideas. Even such an otherwise excellent mind as Albrecht Haller fell into this condition, and in the course of a long conducted, often also interrupted diarium of the state of his soul, got finally so far, that he asked a celebrated theologian, his former academical colleague — Dr.
Less — whether he might not find comfort for his anxious soul in the extensive treasure of Dr. Less s theological knowledge. To observe the various acts of the power of representation in myself, when I myself call them forth, is well worth the study, and is especially necessary and useful for logic and metaphysics. But to try to watch them as they also enter the mind uncalled which is done through the play of the unintentionally fancying imagination , is a reversion of the natural order in our faculty of cognition, because the principles of thinking do not then precede, as they ought to, but follow those notions, and either is already a disease of the mind notionalness , or leads to it and to the lunatic asylum.
For it is not with those inner as with our external experiences of objects of space, wherein objects appear by the side of each other and as permanently fixed. The inner sense sees the relations of its determinations only in time and hence as flowing; and in that case no permanence of observation takes place, which nevertheless is essential for experience. Concerning the Representations which we have without being Conscious of them. To have representations, and yet not to be conscious of them, seems to involve a contradiction ; for how can we know that we have them if we are not conscious of them?
This objection was raised already by Locke, who on that account rejected the existence of such sort of representations. But then we may be mediately conscious of having a representation without being immediately conscious of it. Such representations are then called dim, the others being clear and if their clearness extends even to the representations of parts and their connections distinct or perspicuous —representations whether of thinking or of contemplation.
It may lill us with admiration of our own nature that the i. The former is a consciousness of the understanding, the latter is the inner sense; the former is the pure, the latter the empirical apperception; for which reason the former is falsely called the inner" sense. In psychology we investigate ourselves according to the representations of our inner sense, but in logic we investigate selves according to the requirements of our intellectual consciousness.
Now, here the ego seems to us to be double, which would be contradictory. The question whether, in consideration of the various inner conditions of his mind his memory, or his adopted principles , man can still say, although conscious of those changes, that lie is one and the same individual in regard to his soid, is an absurd quest ion, since he c:in become conscious of those changes only by representing himself as one and the same subject in those various conditions, and since the ego of man although dual, to be sure, in regard to its form the manner of it- representation , i-; not. Whatever the eye discovers through the telescope —in the moon, for instance — or through the microscope, say in the infusoria —is seen by our naked eye ; for those optical aids do not bring more rays, and hence pictures created by them, into our eye than would have imaged themselves upon our retina without those artificial helps, but they merely expand them further in order to bring them into our consciousness.
The same can be said of the feelings of our sense of hearing ; when a musician, for instance, plays with ten fingers and two feet a fantasia upon an organ —mayhap even speaking with another person at the same time—and when thus in a moment a number of representations are awakened in the soul, each of which, moreover, requires a special judgment upon its appropriateness in its selection, since a single inharmonious stroke of the finger would be immediately perceived as a discord ; whilst, after all, the whole turns out so that the impromptu-playing musician wishes often that many a happily executed fantasia of his, which he does not expect ever to be able to write down as good, had been preserved in notes.
Thus the field of dim representations is the largest in man. This is the case, for instance, with sexual love, in so far as it intends Dot so much the love as the enjoyment of its object. How much wit has been wasted for ever and a day to throw a thin veil over what is certainly liked, but still puts man in the light of such close relationship with the lower animals that it excites shame, and requires language in line society not to speak openly, though sufficiently transparent to excite a smile.
Imagination likes to walk in the dark here, and it always requires more than common art to avoid cynicism and yet not to lapse into a ridiculous purism. On the other hand, however, we are often enough the play of dim representations that will not vanish even though the understanding illuminates them.
It is often an important matter for a dying person to order his grave to be dug in his garden, or under a shady tree in the field, or in dry ground, although in the former case he has no beautiful prospect to hope for, and in the latter not the least cause to fear catching a cold from dampness. The proverb "The dress makes the man," applies also in a certain degree to intelligent people. It is true that the Russian proverb says, "We receive a guest according to his dress, but accompany him, when he leaves, according to his intelligence"; but intelligence can, after all, not prevent the vague impression of a certain importance which surrounds a well dressed person, and can at the uttermost correct a previous judgment.
White stockings, for instance, make the ankles appear larger than black ones; a tire in the night on a high mountain appears to be larger than it Is when you measure it. Immortality of the Soul. Asa general rule, however, a certain degree of the mysterious in writings is not unwelcome to the reader, because it makes him feel his own sharpsightedness to solve the dark into clear conceptions.
Wolcott, taken at the sessions of the Jacksonville Ills. Plato Club, and embodies the views presented by Dr. Tones, the subtle thinker who leads the conversations. The Universe consists of two worlds, the Mental and the Material, the Intelligible and the Sensible; the one Eternal, the other Temporal ; the one existing always according to Same, the other always according to Different. The Forms of Intelligible Entities exist as the one world generated, and mutable things as the other : the one is the Substance, the other the Image of it ; Nothing is the Mirror, and Nature the Image.
The Intelligible world is the essential world that perpetually maintains the Apparent. From the stand-point of the Intelligible we realize, on the one hand, the outlook to the Sensible, the Material; on the other, the insight toward the Ineffable, the Supreme, the One. The Intelligible or Spiritual consciousness is a valid, the Sensible or Material consciousness alone is an invalid witness. Of the objects of the one world we have Natural sensations by means of their images in the organs of the Physical senses ; of the other, we have Psychical sensations by means of the images of the Supernatural or Essential forms in the organs of the Psychical body.
The former sensations are the occasion and ground of our perceptions of external objects ; the latter sensations are the occasion and ground of our perception of supernatural subjects or true Entities. The images of external things other close to the horizon ; for in both cases shining objects that are seen through a more dimmed strata of air close to the horizon appear to be high in the sky, and that which is dark is also judged to be smaller by the surrounding light.
Hence, in target shooting a black target with a white circle in the midst would be more favorable to hitting the mark than the reverse. Every subsisting nature is self-subsisting in this, that it makes a return to the fountain from which it proceedeth. The return in the Universe is what we call Nature.
Uni-verse is the turn or circuit of The One. Every proceeding Spiritual Form, in its return to its fountain, becomes sensibly visible. We come into this sensible world for ends which are within us. The artist may think of his subject for many years before the perfect idea is formed in his mind. This is the essential form. The primary causes have wrought in the spiritual plane ; the mind and heart have proceeded to this effect. This is the going forth, the working to an End, the soul energizing.
Mind apprehends an End and works to that End. The essential work of the artist is done when the mental form is complete. That which went forth from the mind is imaged back from the stone. It goes out a Spiritual Form, it is imaged back a Sensible Form. The essential status is in the world of Mind, the sensible image in the world of Matter. God, looking upon His Creation, called it good. It returned back to Him in power and life. Nothing is the background which returns the Form. When you look toward the image, you look toward nothing.
The stone is nothing as an Essential Idea ; it merely reflects the image. There is that which energizes to ends above the Finite, which again returns to its Fountain: this is the Cycle of the One. All that which we call Nature is related to the Invisible, as the Statue to the Essential Form in the mind of the artist. Those who merely the visible form do not get the artist s idea. The artist, himself is more exalted when he has achieved his work: it returns to him in added power. This work is the Universe. Tin- eternal business of the soul is Existence, and this embraces tin experiences of the realms of Generation, in which the mutation and change through which the soul passes do not change or affect the identity of the soul itself.
If the Cause is forever the same, then the Effect must be forever the same. Mutable Forms have their hyparxis in secondary causes, and must therefore themselves be mutable and destructible. The Form of the Body is not destructible, but in its materialities, in its vital chemistries, it changes ; for Material Forms have their hyparxis in the world of mutation, but the Essential Form, as also the world of Essential Forms, has its hyparxis in The One, the First Cause.
But the Image the Physical world -is not the thing imaged the Spiritual world. It is essentially differenced from it. The worlds of primary and secondary causation are not continuously but discretely differentiated. The Soul is eternally caused, and so is eternally caused alike in the image of its Maker. Since the cause cannot change, so the thing caused cannot be changed. The Universe is the determination, progression, and return of the First Cause. Of the nature of the Soul are two prime predicates, Eternity and Immortality.
The second predicate is its Immortality. The capability of existence in the exclusive consciousness of sensible corporeality, even unto the Grave and Death and Hell of sense, oblivioned as to True Being through the experiences of Generation and Regeneration, without forfeiture of its Ever-abiding, Eversubsisting tenure in life; thus a capability of existing Mortally or in Death, and Immortally or in that which is not Death.
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Man is not a Material Being, nor yet a Physical Being. Physics and Matter are his subordinates, his means and instruments in Time ; but from these he subsists not at all. He is a plant of Celestial Genus. No physical or material nutriments can ever become components of Mind or of Mental processes. These natures are diverse and not related in continuous degrees, and the lower nature cannot become the higher. Man appropriates the material elements, forces, and forms, to the subsistence of his corporeal instrumentalities, like to like, and so must feed himself with the knowledges of Divine Truth and the participations of Divine Good.
In Nature man finds provision for his gymnastics; in the Heavens, his food. The Natural mind, or they who put sense before Intelligence, observing only the conversion of the Divine energies from Lasts to Firsts, predicate as the sole order Matter, Form, Psychic Essence, Intelligence; this is Mortal vision in Sublunary light : while the Spiritual mind, or they who are in Dialectic Science, put the Intelligible before the Sensible, observing the progressions of the Divine Energies from on high to the extremities of things, and predicate as the order Intelligence, Psychic Essence, Form, Matter ; this is Immortal vision in Supernatural light.
We mortals are trooping through the valley and shadow of Death. We still light with Achilles and with Plato. We are all immured in the Cave in the Earth, struggling with shadows of the true Forms of the world above. We tread the courts of Death and Hell with Dante, and with the Prodigal Son we take leave of our Father s house, with our portion of goods.
Descending through natural generation, we squander our goods in riotous living, in sensuous realizations. Here is the soul in a foreign land, most servilely occupied —would fain feed itself upon the husks of Time and Sense-things; — so are we fallen. On the other hand, we all voyage with Ulysses; we are reminiscent and dialectic with Plato unto the light and beauty of True Being.
We are all purged, with Dante, through the self-denying, cathartic disciplines. We are all quickened, repentant, and converted, with the Prodigal Son, toward the Fathers house, our home. The history of natural Generation and Regeneration is the subject of the Apocalyptic myth of Scripture, of the Epos, and of Philosophy. It is the cognition of Spiritual and Absolute Verity in contradistinction to the phantasies of sense : that which cancels the Mortal in the verification of the Spiritual. In the one consciousness, we are in the belief that death is life ; in the other, we are in the science of life, in spiritual verities.
To abide eternally and invariably in the spiritual is the capability and prerogative of Divine natures. Continuance forever in the exclusive consciousness and experiences of natural generation is the endless Hell. It may be supposed that linite natures might tire of either. Finite natures must be equipoised between, must find the harmonic reconciliation in the centric revolutions of the circles of Same and Different, between Mortality and Immortality, between Death and Life, between Truth and Falsehood, between Good and Evil, as representatively is the source of Nature s life in the equilibration of Heat and Cold, Light and Darkness, in perpetual correlation and alternation.
The soul is a microcosmal abyss, in which are thegerminals of all it ever was or will become. We cannot define it. In this, it is likened to the Divine. It carries its fortunes within itself. We have taken upon ourselves a material body, and descended into the plane of materiality, to effect a purpose. That which is individualized down into Nature is in an infinitely small part of us. We do not know ourselves in the natural or mortal consciousness.
We are exclusively identified and unified with Nature, the Not-Me. We are individual, not divisible, in our sensible grounds of cognition. Nature is cognized as the Only, the Absolute. Positivism seeks to verify this. Of this contemplation, from this ground of personal, spiritual consciousness and existence therein, we predicate the Immortality of the Soul.
From this point of view may be apprehended the idea of the Divine Personality of Jesus, and his affirmation, "I know whence I come, and whither I. The soul s capability of existing immortally, and also mortally, is affirmed in the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures as the first Adam and the second Adam, the natural man and the spiritual man, the earthy man and the heavenly man, as they that are in the graves of existence and they that have attained unto the resurrection of life.
The mortal life of the Soul, apprehended in the universal totalities, is a "Divina Commedia" and not Tragedy as appreciated by the sense mind in sublunary light. In its Individuality the Soul is oblivioned to its great self, divided from it. There are two lives of the Soul, that of its Natural consciousness, and that of its Spiritual consciousness. The soul in its natural consciousness affirms positiveness of natural things and denies spirituality. It is this that Paul affirms : the man is dead to spiritual things, separated from himself, the individual extant only in the divided part of him.
We see how a soul is thus narrowed. We were individualized down into this life for certain reasons — one soul for one purpose, another soul for a different purpose. Whether the idiot is personally more or less than ourselves we do not know. Our business, and that of the idiot, is to get down more perfectly into materia] bodies that which is purposed. There is a Great Personal Self in all which we cannot see. The Divine alone knoweth what is in man.
Zeller s Theory of Cognition. The soul in its Inmosts is related to the Divine ; in its Outmosts, to the outmosts of things. The Personal soul voices all things, from the Most High to the pebble ; is pervious to all voices, all harmonies. In this is realized the meeting and reconciliation of extremes, that the soul in its conscious Individuality realizes its differentiation from all other creatures, and, at the same time, in its conscious Personality it is expansed into knowledge of, and alliance with all Forms in Heaven and Earth.
We see, then, how small a part of the whole is manifested in our individual consciousness: the Universe cannot sound through us. In this we are allied to the beasts ; in our great consciousness, with the world of Intelligible Forms and Entities. There is a Psychic Body and there is a Body Pneumatic. Material corporeality is not philosophically predicable of the nature of man. Logic is the name given, for the past two thousand years, to the entire course of those inquiries which relate to the thinking faculty purely as such, aside from the distinct content of thought.
It is to exhibit the forms and laws of thought, without pretending to assert anything concerning the objects cognizable through them. To this Logic of an earlier date is opposed another of a more modern origin, taught by Hegel and his followers. It claims to furnish not only a knowledge of the forms of thought, but also a knowledge of the Real which constitutes the object of thought; it claims that its subject does not simply embrace logic but also metaphysics, and for this reason is known by the name of the Speculative in contradistinction to the ordinary purely Formal logic.
In my opinion, this co-ordination of logic and metaphysics, or the ontological part of metaphysics, is improper. It is said, of course, that the form cannot be separated from the substance ; mere forms of thought, which may ix—3. This argument, however, is liable to many objections. In the first place, it is always a figure of speech to say that thoughts are the essence of things ; for though this essence is an object of our thought, it is not directly thought itself; it is known through thought, but it does not subsist in thought, and is not produced by it.
Yet, even aside from this, it follows by no means that the forms of thought, because they are in all instances actually invested with a specific content, cannot become an object of research without this content. We come nearer the truth by saying that it is the problem of a scientific analysis to distinguish the various elements in our representations, to separate that which is involved and blended in the phenomenal, enabling us in this manner to explain the empirical data from their primary elements. In doing this, respecting our thinking consciousness in general, —in considering the general forms of thought by themselves without reference to the particular content, logic is not engaged in anything unreal or untrue.
The same objection might beurged against mathematics, because this science investigates the essential properties of numbers without regard to the peculiar qualities of that which forms the subject of calculation—the general relations of an object in space without reference to the physical nature of bodies. But as certain aspects and properties of the Real are in this case taken by themselves as so many subjects of contemplation, formal logic is likewise concerned with something real—with thought as this particular fact in the spiritul life of man ; the only qualification being this, that it considers this reality, thought, simply in respect to its form without regard to its content.
This separate treatment of the modes of thought is, however, not only proper; it is absolutely essential. For, since the results of every inquiry are dependent upon the method we employ, it is impossible to attempt with anything like a scientific certainty an examination of the Heal, in case the conditions and forms of the scientific method we adopt has.
Zellefs Theory of Cognition. This forms, however, the very subject of logic. Hence logic must, in the shape of a scientific methodology, precede every empirical investigation of the Real ; and this holds good not simply of those branches which concern themselves with the special departments of the Real—Nature and the human mind—but applies with equal force to metaphysics and its most elementary part, to-wit, ontology : this, too, cannot be treated successfully without a previous understanding as to the manner of its treatment,—without, for instance, an antecedent knowledge, whether they are established by an a priori or a posteriori method, whether by reflection from empirical data or by a dialectical construction.
Logic is consequently as little identical with metaphysics as with any other branch of systematized philosophy bearing directly upon a knowledge of the object, but it precedes it. The former has to investigate the most universal determinations of all reality, the latter the forms and laws of human cognition. Yet, how different these two problems are is made evident by the logic of Hegel. By far the greater part of its categories express only determinations of objective Being without any direct reference to the forms of thought; those qualities, on the other hand, which are descriptive of these forms, apply to the objective world in a metaphysical sense.
The operations of thought by dint of which we cognize the essence of things are evidently different from that which is known through them; they would be immediately co-ordinated only in case the object were to exist only in thought, or in case it were to leave its impression, absolutely invariable, upon the latter without any aid whatsoever from our own spontaneous activity. Nevertheless, the fault found with logic, as it was in its earlier stages, for the reason that it was devoid of real foundation, is not without cause, although this foundation is not to be looked for in metaphysics, but in the theory of cognition.
It is impossible to establish by a certain view regarding the objective world that science which precedes every objective knowledge ; but it is certainly possible to base it upon a view respecting the general elements and conditions of the act of cognition whose particular forms it is to de. Only upon these grounds can logic be successfully defended against the charge of formalism as far as this charge is well founded at all. Logic, of course, is a formal science as well as grammar or pure mathematics; and such it must be. Forinalistic, however, it will be only when it uses these forms without understanding their real import, without consequently distinguishing the essential from the unessential.
Since this activity of the mind forms, then, the peculiar subject of the Theory of Cognition, it is quite apparent that if is the theory of cognition upon which logic has to fall back if the modes of thought shall be a living element in its operations and lose the appearance of arbitrary formulas. It is, however, not simply its connection with logic in which we are to find the true meaning of the Philosophical Theory of Cognition.
This science rather constitutes the formal groundwork of Philosophy in all its departments; from it must come the final decision as to the right method in Philosophy and in science generally. For, as regards the manner in which we have to proceed in order to secure correct notions, we shall be able to form an opinion only according to the conditions upon which the foundation of our representations, owing to the nature of our mind, depends ; these very conditions, however, are to be examined by the theory of cognition which is accordingly to determine whether and by virtue of what hypothesis the human mind is capacitated for the cognition of truth.
The necessity of such an inquiry has consequently been urged in philosophy from the time that Socrates put forth the idea of a method which is employed in the manner demanded by a positive conviction as to the nature of human knowledge. But it was not until the last few centuries that its full meaning became apparent and that its subject was more accurately defined.
In the founders of modern philosophy, in the minds of Bacon and Descartes, the two. Whilst Bacon assumed that all knowledge proceeded from experience, Hobbes endeavored to show more distinctly in what manner our ideas and thoughts arise from sensation, and Locke, openly combatting the theory of innate ideas, proved the subjective and objective experience of man to be the two sources to which the entire content of consciousness had to be traced exclusively. In opposition to him, Leibnitz advocated the Cartesian view of innate ideas, and he was consistent enough to carry this view, in conformity with the postulates of his system, to the point towards which it already had tended unmistakably in the Cartesian school and in the philosophy of Spinoza —to-wit, the assertion that all our representations, without exception, were innate ideas— that all were created within our own minds, and that they of course coincided in time with the external phenomena, but were not directly produced by their action.
Volume: 99, Issue: 3, pp. Donica Belisle and Kiera Mitchell. Volume: 81, Issue: 4, pp. Ian McKay and Robert Wright. Related Articles. Notes Volume 2. Publications Volume 2. Reviews Volume 2. Notes Volume 3. Publications Volume 3. Reviews Volume 3.
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